



Courting Trouble. The Role of the Courts in 
Contemporary Democracy 
Conor Gearty 
I. The Spectre of Juristocracy 
Was Keith Ewing the first scholar to come up with this devastating term, ‘Juristocracy’, to 
describe the way democratic societies can be crushed by unelected judges under cover of 
ostensible principles like ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the protection of human rights’? 1 Certainly 
Ran Hirschl uses it in the title for his well-known work, but this was published ten years 
later.2 Now it turns up regularly. The sub-editors of a Rod Liddle article deployed it for a 
piece he wrote for the Spectator in July 2012, using Hirschl as a route in to critiquing judges 
but from the perspective of the populist right.3 Jon Holbrook has the term in his attack on a 
recent Supreme Court case on abortion which, he says, ‘should worry democrats’.4 There are 
pages and pages on it in Google, much of it Hirschl-related or Hirschl-inspired – but no Keith 
Ewing. Adam Tomkins, who was Ewing’s colleague at the time the chapter that seems to 
have coined the term appeared, acknowledges Ewing’s parentage in his Our Republican 
Constitution5 but Hirschl himself fails to do so, despite citing the chapter where it appears – 
even going so far as to truncate the title of that chapter in his footnote so as to excise the 
reference to juristocracy that appears there. 6 To paraphrase a man whom I know Ewing 
                                                 
1 KD Ewing, ‘The Bill of Rights Debate: Democracy or Juristocracy in Britain?’ in KD Ewing, CA Gearty and 
BA Hepple (eds), Human Rights and Labour Law. Essays for Paul O’Higgins (London, Mansell, 1994) 147–
187. 
2 R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 2004). 
3  R Liddle, ‘Rise of the juristocracy. Why have we handed unelected judges so much power?’ Spectator 
(London, 7 July 2012) 
4  J Holnbrook, ‘Another step towards juristocracy’ (Spiked, 11 June 2018) www.spiked-
online.com/newsite/article/another-step-towards-juristocracy/21487#.W3uxY9VKjIU.  
5 A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) 7 (fn 25). 
6 Hirschl (n 2) 256 (fn 41). 
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greatly admired, E P Thompson, it is time ‘to rescue’ the origins of this powerful word from 
the ‘enormous [silence] of posterity’.7 
The chapter where as I say so far as I know it first appeared was part of a collection 
for Paul O’Higgins which Ewing, the late Professor Bob Hepple and I co-edited in 1994.8 In 
it, Ewing laid out the ‘central dilemma’ he wanted to address in the form of a question: ‘how 
can we reconcile with the first principles of democratic self-government the transfer of 
sovereign power from an elected legislature to an unelected judiciary?’9 In Ewing’s view, 
three fundamental points must underpin any answer to this question. First there is ‘the 
principle of equal participation; that is to say, the right of us all to participate as equals in the 
policy-making institutions of government’. 10  Since it is obvious that ‘the sheer size of 
contemporary society’ makes it impossible ‘for us all to participate in the making of 
decisions’ 11  (more on this later), we are forced ‘as a practical necessity’ to embrace 
representative government, and so the second core principle ‘is simply that in [such] a system 
… the representatives must be selected by the community they claim to represent.’12 And 
thirdly, flowing also from the first two propositions, ‘those who hold representative positions 
must in some sense be accountable to the people they represent for the decisions they purport 
to take on their behalf’.13 The rest of Ewing’s chapter is a magnificent exposure of quite the 
extent to which judges fail the democratic test on all these scores and should as a result most 
certainly not be empowered to exercise sovereign power either in general or (in particular) 
through enactment of any kind of entrenched Bill of Rights. Writing at a time when ‘New 
Labour’ was slowly emerging, and after its leader John Smith had made an important speech 
on constitutional change in March 1993,14 Ewing concludes that any change of this sort in the 
UK;  
would represent a monumental historic retreat, a step backwards from democracy to the 
creation of what could only be regarded as a juristocracy, a system of government 
                                                 
7  EP Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, Victor Gollancz, 1963) preface. 
8  Ewing, ‘The Bill of Rights Debate’ (n 1). 
9  Ibid, 147–148. 
10 Ibid, 149. 
11 Ibid, 149. 
12 Ibid, 150. 
13 Ibid. 
14 For the background see D Erdos, ‘Charter 88 and the Constitutional Reform Movement: A Retrospective’ 
(2009) 62 Parliamentary Affairs 537–551. 
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predominantly by lawyers and judges, from participation in which the great bulk of the people 
would be permanently and irrevocably excluded.15  
How does Ewing’s essay read today? His ‘central dilemma’ rests on an assumption about the 
transfer of ‘sovereign power ... to an unelected judiciary’16 from which all else flows. Of 
course as we all know the Human Rights Act 1998 enacted by Parliament in the first term of 
Tony Blair’s Labour Government did not transfer power in this way, in fact (not least because 
of the powerful case against made at the time by Keith Ewing) explicitly preserved 
parliamentary sovereignty.17 The lively British debate ever since has been about the breadth 
of the legislation’s interpretive mandate 18  and the extent to which the non-obligatory 
declarations of incompatibility in section 4 are or are not mandatory as a matter of political 
reality.19 Of course it is putting it mildly to say that Ewing is no fan of this rights instrument: 
his Bonfire of the Liberties. New Labour, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, published in 
2010, does not hold back, being particularly critical of how the interpretive power in the Act 
can be used to wreak policy havoc by escaping the legislative intention in specific cases.20 In 
his 1994 essay, however, Ewing was a little less sceptical about such an approach, at least in 
(what of course was then) theory:  
The problems, admittedly, would be much less acute if the Bill of Rights (or an incorporated 
European Convention) were to be limited in its scope by operating simply as a guide to the 
interpretation of statutes and as a means of regulating executive discretion, but not also as a 
device for limiting the sovereign power of Parliament.21  
One’s perspective here probably depends on the line one takes about the character of the 
declarations, and how much one is willing as well to see the hand of a de facto sovereign 
legislature in the judges’ statutory mandate to do what is ‘possible’ to ensure that primary 
                                                 
15 Ewing ‘The Bill of Rights Debate’ (n 1) 182. 
16 Ibid, 147–148. (Emphasis added). The problem of course remains a highly topical one. Cf R Bellamy, 
Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); and (more recently but very much in the Ewing spirit) G Webber et al, 
Legislated Rights. Securing Human Rights Through Legislation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2018). The issues have also been given a re-airing in Lord Sumption’s Reith lectures for 2019: 
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0005f05.  
17 HRA 1998, ss 3(2)(b), 6(2). 
18 HRA 1998, s 3(1).  
19 HRA 1998, s 4: see R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice; R (AM and AP) v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657. 
20 KD Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties. New Labour, Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010). CA Gearty, On Fantasy Island. Britain, Strasbourg and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016) offers a different perspective. 
21 Ewing ‘The Bill of Rights Debate’ (n 1) 181–182. 
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legislation is ‘read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights’ by 
giving (for example) the test of proportionality a far greater reach than the old pre-rights 
criteria for judicial review would have achieved.22 
One line that was unequivocal in Ewing’s chapter is his castigation of judicial review 
as an exercise in sovereign power under cover of supposedly seeking to maintain a society’s 
fundamental values. Here the target is Alexander Bickel whose early book The Least 
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 23  was very influential in 
promoting acceptance in the US of the exercise of wide-ranging substantive power by the 
Warren and Burger supreme courts from the mid-1950s through to the 1970s. The exposure 
to criticism of the judges here is as to the inevitability of their having to choose which values 
and principles to prioritise or (as in the US, if there is already a document to hand) how to 
interpret its ‘inevitably open-textured’ nature. 24  Because values are themselves political, 
giving the judges a definitive say on their content is indeed plausibly to set them up as 
juristocrats gazing down on rather than being part of the democratic struggle below. Ewing is 
very persuasive on the impact such reasoning has had on the US and Canadian frameworks of 
democratic decision-making.25 An academic perspective from the US, published a decade or 
so after Bickel, the ‘noble attempt to reconcile the practice of judicial review with the 
principles of democratic government’ that ‘is to be found in the work of John Hart Ely’, was 
also the subject of withering critique from Ewing in his 1994 essay. 26 Eschewing Bickel’s 
overt value-laden approach, Ely argued in favour of ‘a participation-oriented, representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review’27 which would permit strike-downs of legislation 
‘only where the democratic process itself is malfunctioning’. 28  But as with Bickel, this 
‘representation-reinforcing function’ inevitably ‘requires the courts to confront hard 
                                                 
22 HRA 1998, s 3(1). See A Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2008); and also the same author’s Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
23 A Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 
1962). 
24 Ewing ‘The Bill of Rights Debate’ (n 1) 160. 
25 Ibid, 159–163.  
26 Ibid, 163, with JH Ely’s Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1980) mainly in mind. 
27 Cited by Ewing, Ely (n 26) 87. 
28 Ewing ‘The Bill of Rights Debate’ (n 1) 163. 
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questions about the very system of democracy itself’.29 Which voting system is the ‘right’ 
one? Does campaign election expenditure legitimately amplify certain voices or 
disproportionately favour the already economically powerful? 30  Once again, there is no 
escaping important value judgments by recasting them as (merely) procedural. 31  So for 
Ewing, Ely falls at the same fence as Bickel, just in a way that is less easy for the passing 
reader to detect.   
In 1994, it seemed unthinkable that the courts could ever assert an approach of any of 
these sorts in Britain, without even a Bill of Rights scaffold on which to hang it. True there 
had been drifts in the direction of constitutional rights of a sort, sometimes rooted in the 
common law,32 sometimes drawing inspiration from the European Convention on Human 
Rights33 and mainstream judicial review was certainly developing an increased robustness,34 
but all of this felt as though it fell well short of the sort of judicial engagement at which 
Ewing was taking aim. Then, a little more than ten years after Ewing’s chapter appeared, 
against all expectations, the UK House of Lords threw a Bickel-shaped cat among the 
democratic pigeons, in R (Jackson) v Attorney General. 35  In that well-known case, a 
challenge to the use of the Parliament Acts to achieve a ban on hunting foxes with dogs, Lord 
Steyn asserted that parliamentary sovereignty was a common law construct, and that what the 
judges gave the judges could take away:  
it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a 
principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional 
circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the 
courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new Supreme Court may have to 
consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament 
acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.36 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 164. 
30 J Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted. Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
31 Ewing, ‘The Bill of Rights Debate’ (n 1) 163–167. 
32 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] UKHL 18, [1993] AC 534. 
33 A line of cases that had begun as early as the 1970s: see, eg, R (Bhajan Singh) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [1976] QB 198. 
34 R (Fire Brigades Union) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1995] UKHL 3, [1995] 2 AC 513. 
35 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. 
36 Ibid [102]. 
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Lord Hope agreed that ‘the courts have a part to play in defining the limits of Parliament’s 
legislative sovereignty’.37 Baroness Hale considered that ‘the courts will treat with particular 
suspicion (and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing 
governmental action affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny’.38 Rather 
more dramatically albeit with greater circumspection, Lord Carswell wondered about the 
legitimacy of a law proposing ‘a fundamental disturbance of the building blocks of the 
constitution’.39 
Now all of this is pretty strong stuff for democrats, outrageous even to those who give 
credit to Ewing’s fundamental democratic principles and how far such interventions would 
undermine them (yet to materialise in the UK post-Jackson, it has to be said40). The case was 
warmly applauded by judicial activists41 but certainly much criticised at the time as well, 
particularly by those who take a ‘Ewing’ line on the restriction of judicial power.42 Looking 
back on Jackson from the vantage point of the present, does the depth of the outrage 
expressed then depend on the relative health of the democratic process being put under (to 
coin a phrase) ‘anxious scrutiny’43 in this way? Reflect again on Lord Steyn’s Ely-esque 
assumption that judges’ would intervene to protect principle only in situations where the 
impugned executive excess had been made possible by the inaction of a ‘complaisant’ 
Commons. This is to turn the judicial oversight away from substance (Lady Hale’s ‘rights of 
the individual’; Lord Carswell’s ‘building blocks’) and towards process: how 
active/complaisant have the elected representatives been? If the former there is no role for the 
courts; if the latter, there is.  
But active/complaisant with regard to what? It must be in relation to the holding of 
elected representatives to account, the third of Ewing’s three fundamental principles, applied 
                                                 
37 Ibid [107]. 
38 Ibid [159]. 
39 Ibid [178]. A theory that allows liberal democracy to fight back against its own destruction has Continental 
admirers: see A Sajó, Militant Democracy (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2004). 
40 But see R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal and others [2019] UKSC 22, [2019] 2 
WLR 1219. 
41  See the Symposium on ‘The Changing Landscape of British Constitutionalism’ (2011) 9 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 79–273, esp T Allan, ‘Questions of Legality and Legitimacy: Form and 
Substance in British Constitutionalism’ Ibid 155–162. 
42 Including by myself: CA Gearty, ‘Are Judges Now Out of Their Depth?’ (The JUSTICE Tom Sargant 
Memorial Annual Lecture 2007) [2007] Justice Journal 8: https://2bquk8cdew6192tsu41lay8t-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/JUSTICE-Journal-2007-vol4-no2.pdf.  
43 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514. 
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now not to the accountability of all MPs to their constituents but rather to that sub-set of MPs 
who (with colleagues from the House of Lords) make up the executive branch of government, 
and are answerable not to the electors as such so much as to their colleague MPs (those not in 
government) in the lower House. Now without doubt in (by the standards we have grown 
accustomed to) normal constitutional times judgments about how proper parliamentary 
action/inaction has been is very much in the eye of the beholder: passive acquiescence to a 
savagely wrong intervention in the minds of some is necessary and responsible, supportive 
decision-making to others. 44 Thus while we may well have thought that times in which 
Jackson appeared to have been abnormal – there was the post 11 September 2001 attacks 
indefinite detention power in the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 that had just 
been declared a breach of rights by the House of Lords,45 and various proposals for the 
empowering of the executive and the restriction of judicial review in the immigration context 
were swirling in the political ether46 – they look from the perspective of today’s Brexit-
induced constitutional chaos to have been a model of calm. This fluidity in our perception of 
the import of any given moment surely tends to confirm the Ewing-esque scruples we might 
already have about the judges getting stuck in too quickly and too much. The Labour 
administration of the day may have had views about various matters that were controversial, 
extending beyond hunting with dogs into more sensitive matters related to national security 
and judicial review in specific arenas for sure, but (with hindsight, admittedly) it would be 
hard to see any of what was then proposed/defeated/enacted as beyond the pale of entirely 
proper vigorous democratic debate. The ‘building blocks’ of the constitution were hardly 
being challenged; rather parliamentary battles were being fought to achieve change on the 
margins.  
How deep should such judicial self-denial go? Can anything at all push the courts into 
legitimate, protective action? So far in this chapter I (and Ewing in 1994) have been assuming 
a system that is operating with reasonably effective accountability to the legislature for the 
                                                 
44 Michael Heseltine’s removal of the Mace from its place in the Commons Chamber on 27 May 1976, and his 
advancing towards the government benches with it menacingly in his hands, will be remembered by some. The 
casus belli was the reneging of a pairing agreement made by the government on a crucial matter related to the 
then controversial Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill, but so far as I know no one thought for a moment that the 
relevant clause in the law subsequently enacted could be challenged in court.  
45 R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68. 
46 Clause 14 of the Asylum and Immigration Bill 2004 had proposed the ouster of court oversight of asylum and 
immigration claims but it was modified by the government after sharp criticism: see J Rozenberg, ‘Labour U-
Turn on Asylum Bill’ The Telegraph (London, 16 March 2004). 
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executive branch, and with a rule of law independent enough to prevent not executive 
activism (something well outside the judges’ constitutional job description) but rather – to put 
it crudely – administrative unlawfulness, criminal actions by the executive even. Now of 
course I appreciate that hypotheticals have long been the bane of democrats: suppose this, 
suppose that and then, off the back of a never-to-materialise catastrophe, the proponents of 
judicial sovereign power secure what they want (a reordering of the basis of democratic 
decision-making away from elected representatives and towards courts), a normative 
reshaping which can then be deployed into the future in multiple sub-catastrophic situations. 
This is why the Ewings of this world are rightly sceptical of conceding anything on the basis 
of a doomsday they know will never come. Judicial sceptics are essentially upbeat about the 
corrective capacity of the democratic process, its ability to stop that doomsday before it 
happens rather than rely on courts to undo it afterwards. Is this optimism still warranted?  
II. The Constitution of Social Democracy 
The British Constitution was very well adapted to the growth of social democracy in Europe 
in the decades after World War Two. The electorate had already delivered a large majority 
for a radical Labour Government to reshape relations between the individual and the state, 
through the securing of a ‘welfare’ (as opposed to ‘warfare’) state.47 The accountability of 
executive power to the voters via the legislative branch had been stunningly displayed by the 
removal by the electorate of a war-time Prime Minister at the very height of his powers. The 
team led by Clement Attlee that replaced Winston Churchill did not revolutionise the society 
that elected it. Rather it set about smoothing out the hard edges of the capitalism that had so 
divided society in the 1930s48 and so preventing (or so it was assumed and hoped) the plunge 
into Communism that was a far more credible threat after the war than it had been when the 
Special Branch had been harassing the likes of the aged Thomas Mann for his visits to 
Moscow a decade or so before.49 The UK was an early social democratic space in a Western 
Europe that increasingly took on this character as the decades went by. Equality was the goal 
                                                 
47 The term appears to have been coined by Archbishop William Temple, during the Second World War: see CA 
Gearty, Liberty and Security (Cambridge, Polity, 2013) 22. 
48 See generally KD Ewing and CA Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000) chs 5 and 6. 
49 Ibid, 254. 
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but modified capitalism was to be the means. The resurrected polities of NATO-protected 
Western Europe sought (whatever their governing parties called themselves) to deliver social 
gain via democratic systems that were specifically designed to prevent moves to the Right or 
(far more to the point) Left.  
It was never thought necessary in victorious, Butskellite50 Britain to deploy courts of 
any sort as the guardians of this social democratic consensus. The only Bill of Rights thought 
to be worth having was that through which Parliament had asserted its power against the 
Crown in 1688, 51  and the newly established judicial mechanism for the enforcement of 
human rights to be found in the European Convention on Human Rights likewise passed the 
UK by – it was not until 1966 that individuals could take the UK to the Convention’s 
Strasbourg-based Court and even after this, no ruling of that body could possibly impugn the 
authority of any Act of the sovereign legislature.52 The European Social Charter in 1961, 
policed by Strasbourg’s Committee of Social Rights, marked the embracing of regional 
oversight of democratic choices in the field of social rights as well as the civil and political 
rights of the Convention, 53 but the UK chose not to engage in its collective complaints 
procedure when it became available. 54  And the same was, of course, the case with the 
Common Market which had as early as the late 1960s already embraced a strong judicial 
invigilation of state practice in the name of fundamental rights.55 Even when the country 
joined what by then had become the European Economic Community, in 1973, it did so 
concerned about the possible intrusion into its sovereignty that this entailed, and in the 
decades that followed the more this Europeanisation took the shape of rights-assertion, the 
more the British authorities didn’t like it, opting out if they could and downplaying and 
resisting if they could not.56 
                                                 
50 The short-hand term given to the convergence of the names of two leading Labour (Hugh Gaitskell, Labour 
leader, 1955–1963) and Conservative (‘Rab’ Butler, holder of many important Cabinet positions under 
successive Conservative prime ministers from the 1940s through to 1964) whose views broadly converged on 
the need for social protection and the public interest in growing equality. 
51 Usefully set out at www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/WillandMarSess2/1/2/introduction.  
52 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
53 See www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/035.  
54 KD Ewing and S Weir, ‘The European Social Charter Turns 50 Today, but Britain doesn’t belong at the 
Party’ (Open DemocracyUK, 18 October 2011) www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/stuart-weir-keith-
ewing/european-social-charter-turns-50-today-but-britain-doesnt-belong-.  
55 A O’Neill, EU Law for UK Lawyers, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) ch 6. 
56 D Gowland, Britain and the European Union (Abingdon, Routledge, 2017) is a good generalist account. 
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From the start the less secure democracies on the Continent had taken a different tack, 
initially insulating their political space from rupture by means of oversight by both national 
constitutional courts and the European authorities (Commission and Court) set up under the 
European Convention and then driving forward with exactly those various mechanisms of 
European oversight with which the British would have no truck. Michael Mandel’s fine 
extended essay in the Israel Law Review in 1998, detailing the impact of the embracing of 
constitutional rights in Europe at this time, showed clearly how as he put it in the long title 
‘we changed everything so that everything would remain the same’.57 The Strasbourg Court 
also did its part in this erection of a European democratic fortress. Communists found 
themselves starved of political space, and fascists too did not have everything their own 
way.58 This European story was always different from the one that in books and articles Keith 
Ewing told about the UK. His confidence in the essential health of the democratic process 
made sense of his strictures against the Europeanisation of our judicial involvement in 
politics. While the right of individual application to Strasbourg under the European 
Convention was just about acceptable, it was neither necessary nor desirable to translate this 
into the domestic arena, especially given the historically poor performance of the British 
judges as guardians of civil liberties.59 
The high point of this critique was the juristocracy chapter in 1994, though even then 
it was undeniable that – whatever the occasional winds of change in the case-law60 – the 
reality of political change in Britain had been beginning to have its effect, eventually (I would 
tentatively suggest) calling into question certain assumptions about the democratic process 
that underpinned that critique. I am not thinking here so much of ‘the constitution is broken’ 
movement that emerged at the end of the Thatcher period and which manifested itself in the 
shape of Charter 88 and other similar organisations calling for radical change in the structure 
of government. The prescription offered by these groups struck Ewing as often worse than 
                                                 
57  M Mandel, ‘A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything so that 
Everything Would Remain the Same”’ (1998) 32 Israel Law Review 250. It was, perhaps unsurprisingly, Keith 
Ewing who first drew my attention to this article. 
58 Communist Party of Germany v Germany app 250/57. Cf Vogt v Germany (1996) 21 EHRR 205. On right-
wing controls see Kosiek v Germany app no 9704/82 (28 August 1986). 
59 KD Ewing and CA Gearty, Democracy or a Bill of Rights (London, Society of Labour Lawyers, 1991). 
60 See text at nn 32–35 above. 
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the disease, or at best like ‘treating a heart attack with a used Band-aid’.61 The underlying 
problem, of which Thatcherite excess in the field of civil liberties was an offshoot, lay in the 
deployment of executive power via the legislature to destroy the Butskellite consensus, 
replacing it with various policies that went under many names (monetarism; privatisation; 
trickle-down; etc) but which had a singular effect: the removal of guarantees of social 
protection and the growth of inequality. Started under the cautious leadership of Mrs 
Thatcher, this became the dominant theme of her successor John Major’s five years in office, 
and was eventually embraced as well by a ‘New’ Labour opposition that had come close to 
despair at the prospect of never returning to office. When it eventually did win power, in 
1997, it initially did nothing (quite explicitly) to challenge the policies of the preceding 
decades while however embarking on a noisy round of constitutionalisation to fill a space in 
governance that would otherwise have been empty, the Human Rights Act included among 
the initiatives taken at that time. Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major, and afterwards Mr Blair, all 
enjoyed strong legislative support for their policies, and they exercised power only because of 
the victories their respective Parties had achieved at successive general elections. If we recall 
Ewing’s three basic principles of democratic self-government each was clearly being met: 
pretty well everybody could vote, the resulting government was (broadly) representative, and 
the MPs who kept these governmental shows on the road were always accountable to those 
who elected them, with the threat of defeat in the next election never far from many of their 
minds. To recall my earlier allusion to a potential fourth principle, not explicitly present in 
Ewing’s 1994 formulation, the executive was also in constitutional terms answerable to the 
people’s representatives in the Commons, though of course there were lively discussions 
about how realistic this was, with the Party system then operating very strongly to ensure 
disciplined support in the Commons for the government of the day.62   
At exactly the same time, however, and far from disappearing with the passing of 
time, Europe’s anxiety about the fragility of democratic governance was becoming if 
anything more pronounced than it had been in the immediate post-war decades. The issue has 
increasingly taken centre-stage in the years since 1994. Turkey’s semi-engagement with 
Europe has led to its submission to the oversight of the Strasbourg Court and this has in turn 
produced a series of dramatic interventions by that tribunal in huge national debates about the 
                                                 
61 KD Ewing and CA Gearty Freedom under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990) 275. 
62 See Ewing and Gearty, Struggle for Civil Liberties (n 48) ch 1 for a discussion of this aspect of accountability. 
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legitimacy of certain kinds of democratic political activity. The main left wing Parties had 
won major victories in Strasbourg against government efforts to exclude them from the 
electoral process in 1998,63 but in the Refah Partisi case three years later the European Court 
of Human Rights found that an Islamic-inspired Party then in government in Turkey and with 
a 22 per cent share of the vote could nevertheless be dissolved compatibly with human rights 
principles. 64 The Court came to this conclusion because it judged that an outright win for the 
Party at the next election (a real possibility) would have brought about a breach of 
fundamental democratic principle, and that democracy could not be allowed to eat itself in 
this way, even in situations where it appeared the electors’ choice to do so.65 The Refah 
Partisi decision was of course hugely controversial, but it set the Court’s parameters for 
engagement with the governments of many of its new members in the years that followed. At 
the same time the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington have 
generated in their wake a new atmosphere of tolerance for executive crackdown on dissent, 
while also bringing to the surface of public discourse a move back to national partisanship – 
wholly unexpected in the heady days of post-1989 globalisation – that had been slowly 
growing in the 1990s and to which the events of that day have given a large boost.   
In that first decade of the 2000s, political leaders began to emerge who were happy to 
mine the democratic systems they had inherited for opportunities to grow much stronger 
individual powers out of them, with the invariable route to success being both a strong 
emphasis on threats posed to the very existence of the state by external enemies of various 
sorts and also at the same time a similar focus on enemies within, immigrants, terrorists and 
so on but also, in time, ‘elites’ whose behind-the-scenes manipulation of democracy ruined 
the life chances of the ‘ordinary people’. The economic crises of the mid 2000s led to a 
dramatic reduction in life-chances for many, thus playing into this emerging feeling of anger. 
Democracy continued but often as a camouflage for real power rather than a constraint upon 
its exercise.66 This was not by any means a European phenomenon exclusively – one of its 
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first and most effective exponents was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu67 – but it 
found a ready home in post-Soviet societies whose economic decline created a political 
nostalgia for a people’s strongman. In recent years, therefore, it has not been surprising to see 
the Strasbourg Court drawn into ever-deeper appraisals of the democratic health of its 
Member States.68 More recently but to potentially great effect the European Court of Justice 
has found itself being asked fundamental questions about the democratic health of EU states, 
‘fundamental’ because if the score-card marks a failure then the continued membership of the 
Union can be put in severe doubt,69 a power of escalation that is not so directly accessible in 
the Strasbourg system. 
Today it is credible to say of the political developments just described that they are 
examples of ‘populism’ in action. 70  The European courts are being drawn into disputes 
because their founding documents assume a thicker version of democracy than that which 
regards as enough the election of accountable representatives on a universal suffrage. Putting 
it like this makes clear that the European vision of democracy goes beyond Ewing’s three 
principles to include principles of the rule of law, separation of powers, respect for diversity 
and human rights etc. The result of this is that impeccably elected, accountable 
parliamentarians producing a government which can then do whatever it wants (including 
destroy the system under which it secured power) is not guaranteed to be seen as democratic 
by these unelected guardians of European democracy. We are back in the territory of Ely and 
the Jackson case, and (so far as Strasbourg is concerned) a jurisdiction greatly expanded from 
the days when it covered only Communists and fascists. When one surveys the organised 
shift to presidential styles of government in certain European states, deliberately using a 
power – sanctioned it is true by the people – to destroy inhibitors on the deployment of 
executive power (legal and political) and so as a result to centralise power more and more in 
the hands of a small group (or even in some cases a single individual and his or her family), 
then it is surely hard to say of the Strasbourg Court’s attempts to stop or delay this that these 
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are the actions of a juristocracy? True perhaps, but remembering that Ewing’s 1994 piece had 
Britain mainly in mind it is a valid question certainly to ask what, if anything, this has to do 
with us? 
III. Brexit 
The answer to the question with which we ended the last section flows from closer scrutiny of 
what ‘populism’ means. Of course, this is not the same as ‘popular’: much of what Mrs 
Thatcher did, and after her that other charismatic politician Tony Blair, was popular (council 
house sales; anti-social control orders; terrorism laws; etc). There is an important distinction 
here between process and substance. ‘Popular’ politics use the procedures available to 
achieve the substantive desired outcomes, those pushing this or that specific goal believing 
that it will be well-liked and make them, or continue to make them, the sort of person people 
will (continue to) vote for. Described like this, all democratic politics is ‘popular’. Rather 
than focusing on specific substantive outcomes, ‘populist’ politics, in contrast, attacks the 
pre-existing procedures of representative government. There is a vagueness on vision but a 
highly refined understanding of what makes that vision (vague though it is) impossible to 
realise: it is the democratic process itself (and perhaps other societal phenomena as well) that 
act as impediments to the realisation of the people’s will. Old fashioned democratic 
government as such rather than its embodiment in this or that policy is the enemy of the 
people.  
In addition to being anti-elitist, populists are always antipluralist; populists claim that they, 
and only they, represent the people. Other political competitors are just part of the immoral, 
corrupt elite, or so populists say, while not having power themselves; when in government, 
they will not recognise anything like a legitimate opposition.71  
The people are those who agree with them; the rest – judges; civil servants; politicians; voters 
not on their side – are ‘enemies of the people’ in their pursuit of a ‘singular common good’ 
that ‘the people can discern and will’ and that ‘a politician or a party (or, less plausibly, a 
movement) can [then] unambiguously implement .. as policy.’72 
To use a sporting analogy, populism is going for the player rather than the ball. Of 
course, there has always been something like this in British (as in all democratic) politics but 
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it has been kept very much to the margins. Tony Blair occasionally spiced up his pursuit of 
popularity with recognisably populist ingredients, inveighing against the public sector (‘I bear 
the scars on my back after two years in government and heaven knows what it will be like 
after a bit longer’73) and the Human Rights Act (as on one occasion when (or so Blair 
claimed) probation staff had ‘been so “distracted” by the prisoner’s human-rights claims that 
they [had] lost sight of their duty to protect the public’74). The Conservative Party has of 
course also flirted with such policies in the past, one good example being its tendency to 
inveigh against the bureaucratic constraints on British enterprise, vowing to liberate the 
people from the ‘Nanny State’.75 The dislike of prisoner voting was driven much more by 
hostility to the body that wanted it, in this case the European Court of Human Rights,76 than 
by any particular engagement with the issue itself, an example of a populist talent for reverse-
engineering a policy out of a culture of animosity towards a particular institution. The attack 
on the Strasbourg Court which was mounted off the back of the prisoner votes controversy 
was an early taste of the dislike of that other Europe, the European Union, that was to become 
the signature tune of British populists towards the end of the 2000s, eventually producing the 
referendum of 2016 under which the people ‘took back control’ of their destiny by voting for 
Brexit.77  
A referendum is the perfect vehicle for populists, especially when it combines a 
proposed change that is very vague with an apparent opportunity to give ‘elites’ a kicking by 
voting for it (albeit without really knowing what ‘it’ is). It calls into question Ewing’s 
assumption that we have to have representative government because of the ‘sheer size of 
contemporary society:’ 78 the people can speak directly now and indeed technology does 
allow us (if we are so inclined) to consult them far more frequently, turning Parliament from 
a law-making assembly into an executive body, charged with doing the people’s will: there 
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has been much talk along those lines by enthusiasts for the Brexit referendum result. The 
invariable challenge for successful populists is how to govern; on the one hand they are 
driven to accumulate power by destroying the ‘elite’ buffers that lie between themselves and 
total control; on the other, they are not at all sure how to exercise the power they are thereby 
accumulating. Brexit is a perfect case in point. The enemy is everywhere but the means of 
realising the fact of ‘taking back control’ are proving harder to pin down than had seemed to 
be the case in the excitement of the campaign. The vision remains vague while the elites etc 
who stand in its way are clearly visible to all. The inevitable result is the accumulation of 
power so as to be able to do whatever is necessary to achieve the vision, but without being at 
all sure what that necessity actually entails.  
The result in the context of Brexit is the extraordinary European Union Withdrawal 
Act 2018 with its vast empowerment of the executive to make regulations to deal with 
‘deficiencies arising from withdrawal’ from the EU79 and – in advance of departure and 
assuming an orderly one rooted in agreement – to do whatever ‘the Minister considers 
appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement if the Minister 
considers that such provision should be in force on or before exit day’.80 Both provisions 
expressly allow ministers to ‘make any provision that could be made by an Act of 
Parliament’81 with, however, the important caveat that certain areas are specifically declared 
to be outwith this legislative power.82 Does this huge empowerment of the executive – the 
Minister doing what he or she thinks appropriate – take us close to the Jackson threshold in 
terms of potential judicial oversight? Close I would say, but not over the bar. For this we 
have Parliament to thank. As introduced, clause 9(2) envisaged the regulatory power under 
that section being used to amend the EU (Withdrawal) Act itself: ‘Regulations under this 
section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament’ as has been 
enacted and then the vital addition: ‘(including modifying this Act)’. So the no-go areas in the 
Act, the arrangements on devolved matters, the parliamentary oversight and so on, could have 
been changed by the Minister if he or she thought this ‘appropriate’ for the purposes of the 
withdrawal agreement. Could such a power survive the expunging of the parenthetic 
clarifier? Probably not: section 20 (2)-(5) sets out various provisions where it is desired by 
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regulation to change one part of the main body of the Act, that related to specifying exactly 
when ‘exit day’ is. By allowing it in this specific instance, but only through the provision of 
direct statutory authority, it is surely strongly arguable that parliament has made clear its 
disinclination to allow such executive amending for any other parts of this parent Act. So far 
as the exercise of these Henry VIII clauses affects other pieces of primary legislation, 
schedule 7 now contains a framework for parliamentary scrutiny vastly more intensive and 
complicated than had appeared in the original Bill. We can agree with an expert legal 
commentary that ‘given the scale of the delegated legislative exercise likely to be necessary 
to make retained EU law work, judicial review may have an important role.’ 83  In the 
circumstances Parliament may be thought to have done a fair job of holding the executive to 
account, even though – of course – vast power has been gathered to the centre. (Indeed, as 
Tom Poole has perceptively argued, the effect of many contemporary arguments against 
judicial power along Ewing’s lines from 1994 has been to facilitate the extension of executive 
rather than legislative power.84) 
IV. Conclusion 
Parliament did its work with the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, just as it has done with other 
controversial legislation in the past when large-scale executive powers were sought to deal 
with this or that emergency.85 But it was a fairly close-run thing – might clause 9 (2) as 
introduced have attracted the attention of today’s judicial disciples of Lord Steyn had it been 
the focus of litigation, particularly if the proceedings involved some dramatic reworking of 
the 2018 Act via a regulation that (because of the precise wording of clause 9(2)) could not 
be credibly described as ultra vires? We shall never know. But the populist impulse remains 
strong across Europe and, as the Brexit phenomenon shows us, Britain is not immune. What 
will be next? Repeal of the Human Rights Act? A Westminster-led forced realignment of 
devolved powers, in the name of some kind of English-inspired populist animosity towards 
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the Scots? The abolition of judicial review to avoid ‘elite judges’ calling into question 
execution of the people’s will? The final shredding of the welfare state in the name of 
‘international competitiveness’? Political leaders capable of leading the UK out of the EU to 
foster their own careers are capable of anything. And the Trump presidency acts as an 
inspiration to this sort of politician, as one of their number (at the time of writing about to be 
Prime Minister) has frankly admitted. 86  If the Westminster system of parliamentary 
sovereignty were used to transfer power indefinitely to the executive, under cover perhaps of 
an ongoing post-Brexit emergency (or some sort of terrorist atrocity), what then? To adapt 
Ewing’s own ‘central dilemma’ in his 1994 chapter, ‘how can we reconcile with the first 
principles of democratic self-government the transfer of sovereign power from an elected 
legislature to a [indirectly elected/presidential] executive’? Does the passivity of the courts 
extend to giving safe passage to this sort of move to what might reasonably quickly end up at 
least an authoritarian and perhaps also a fascist state? A hypothetical question certainly, but 
not as hypothetical as it once was. 
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